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I. INTRODUCTION 
Noncitizens who enter the United States without authorization after a prior 
deportation order are subject to federal prosecution.1 Already at an all-time high, 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2020, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. Special 
thanks to Professor Peter M. Shane, Professor Christopher J. Walker, Taylor Tremont, and 
Rachel Shonebarger for their insights and thoughtful suggestions. Thanks also to the Ohio 
State Law Journal editors for their hard work in preparing this Note for publication. It is 
112 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:1 
these prosecutions dramatically increased after former Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions issued a memorandum in April 2017 instructing federal prosecutors to 
make entry-related prosecutions a higher priority nationwide.2 Together, 
unlawful entry and re-entry prosecutions continue to make up more than half of 
all federal prosecutions.3 Concerns that due process violations permeate these 
prosecutions have been widespread,4 but another due process issue underlying 
                                                                                                                     
dedicated in memory of my mom, Lisa deFilippis, who was always immensely supportive 
and encouraging.  
 1 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (“[A]ny alien who has been denied admission, 
excluded, deported, or removed . . . and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time 
found in, the United States . . . shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 
years, or both.”).  
 2 See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., MEMORANDUM FOR ALL FEDERAL 
PROSECUTORS: RENEWED COMMITMENT TO CRIMINAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 1 (Apr. 
11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/956841/download [https:// 
perma.cc/4F95-8TC2]; see also AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, PROSECUTING PEOPLE FOR 
COMING TO THE UNITED STATES 3 (Jan. 2020), https://www.americanimmigration 
council.org/sites/default/files/research/prosecuting_people_for_coming_to_the_unite
d_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8X3-UCYA]; Michelle Mendez, Attorney General Calls 
for Increased Prosecution of Immigration-Related Offenses, CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR. 
NETWORK, INC. (Apr. 26, 2017), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/attorney-general-calls-
increased-prosecution-immigration-related-offenses [https://perma.cc/X6PM-QVAR]. 
Although these prosecutions make up a substantial percentage of all federal prosecutions, 
there is no indication that noncitizens who unlawfully re-enter are especially dangerous. See, 
e.g., Rachel Weiner & John D. Harden, Federal Judge Criticizes Prosecutors over Increase 
in Immigration Cases, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/local/public-safety/federal-judge-criticizes-prosecutors-over-increase-in-illegal 
-immigration-cases/2019/01/10/98d4692e-103c-11e9-84fc-d58c33d6c8c7_story.html 
?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a5b34c3c732f [https://perma.cc/U6H2-RQJF] (“Most 
undocumented immigrants convicted of coming back into the country after deportation do 
not have previous felony or extensive misdemeanor records . . . .”). 
 3 Mendez, supra note 2 (“[F]ederal prosecution for unlawful entry, re-entry, and 
similar offenses . . . constitutes more than half of all federal criminal charges . . . .”); Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Prosecuted a Record-Breaking Number 
of Immigration-Related Cases in Fiscal Year 2019 (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.justice.gov 
/opa/pr/department-justice-prosecuted-record-breaking-number-immigration-related-
cases-fiscal-year [https://perma.cc/6TDJ-T8HG] (reporting the highest annual number of 
prosecutions for felony illegal re-entry and misdemeanor improper entry since records on 
these prosecutions have been kept).  
 4 See Joanna Jacobbi Lydgate, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation 
Streamline, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 481, 530 (2010) (arguing that many migrants are being 
deprived of procedural due process when they are prosecuted in group proceedings with as 
many as eighty defendants appearing before a magistrate at once); Chad R. Doobay, 
Operation Streamline—A Failure of Due Process, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. (Dec. 11, 
2015), https://www.immigrantjustice.org/staff/blog/operation-streamline-failure-due-
process [https://perma.cc/H2U7-TRT2] (questioning whether pleas taken in mass—for 
unlawful entry or re-entry—could really adequately comply with Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which require that guilty pleas be entered knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently); The Immigration Prosecution Factory, KINO BORDER INITIATIVE (Nov. 14, 
2017), https://www.kinoborderinitiative.org/immigration-prosecution-factory/ [https:// 
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re-entry prosecutions bears consideration—whether many deportation orders on 
which these prosecutions are based may themselves be invalid.5 The case of 
Emilio Estrada serves as a concerning example.  
Emilio Estrada was a lawful permanent resident (LPR) for nearly twenty 
years.6 He lived with his wife in Tennessee where they were raising four U.S. 
citizen children.7 In 2007, Mr. Estrada was stopped by the police on his way 
home from work.8 The police found a gun and drugs in Mr. Estrada’s car; he 
was charged with, and ultimately convicted of, possession of a firearm by an 
unlawful user of a controlled substance.9 On the basis of that criminal 
conviction, he faced removal proceedings and was deported in 2009.10  
Years later, Mr. Estrada re-entered the United States, and in 2015 he was 
charged with illegal re-entry.11 Mr. Estrada moved to dismiss the indictment on 
the ground that his prior deportation order was invalid because the Immigration 
Judge (IJ) had failed to inform him of his eligibility for a form of discretionary 
relief from removal, which, if granted, would have allowed him to remain in the 
United States.12 Although there is no guarantee Mr. Estrada would have been 
granted relief, he was deported without ever being informed that he was eligible 
to apply for relief from deportation.13 Nevertheless, in December 2017, the 
United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Mr. Estrada’s claim that his 
                                                                                                                     
perma.cc/N36W-77HC] (“[D]ue process and the right to a fair hearing [are] get[ting] 
steamrolled in the onslaught of prosecutions.”); AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, supra note 2, 
at 3 (noting that attorneys only have minutes to speak with their client in a public setting and 
translation services are minimal).  
 5 This Note uses the phrases “deportation proceeding” and “removal proceeding” 
interchangeably. Current law uses the terms “removable” and “removal” to refer to what is 
colloquially known as “deportable” and “deportation.” See Kevin R. Johnson, An 
Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents, 122 YALE L.J. 2394, 2399 (2013). 
 6 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Estrada v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2623 (2018) 
(No. 17-1233), 2018 WL 1175511, at *1. 
 7 Id.  
 8 Brief for Appellant at 5–6, United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885 (6th Cir. 2017) 
(No. 17-5081). 
 9 Id. at 6 (stating that Mr. Estrada was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)).  
 10 Id. at 9–10. 
 11 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 6, at 6 (stating that Mr. Estrada was 
prosecuted for illegal re-entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)).  
 12 At the time of his removal hearing, Mr. Estrada was statutorily eligible for relief 
under Section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), which grants the 
Attorney General discretion to waive the noncitizen’s inadmissibility if removal “would 
result in extreme hardship” to their spouse or child, who is a U.S. citizen or LPR. United 
States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 888 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2623 (2018); 
see INA § 212(h)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B) (2012). The Attorney General vests IJs 
with the authority to waive inadmissibility. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (2019).  
 13 Most forms of relief from removal in the INA have two components: “(1) statutory 
eligibility criteria that form the threshold for a grant . . . and (2) a favorable exercise of 
discretion, after the threshold criteria are met, to determine whether to grant or deny the 
specific relief.” T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS 
AND POLICY 725–26 (8th ed. 2016). 
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prior deportation order was invalid.14 The court held that noncitizens in removal 
proceedings have no constitutionally protected right to be informed of 
discretionary relief from removal.15  
In so holding, the Sixth Circuit deepened an existing circuit split. The Sixth 
Circuit joined the majority of its sister circuits, which have held that noncitizens 
do not have a due process right to be made aware of eligibility for discretionary 
relief by an IJ or by counsel in removal proceedings.16 In contrast, two federal 
circuit courts have held that noncitizens in removal proceedings do have a 
constitutional right to be made aware of discretionary relief from removal.17  
Being made aware of relief from removal is essential to avoiding 
deportation because, as even a cursory look at the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) demonstrates, immigration law is complex. Noncitizens often are 
unrepresented in removal proceedings and do not know what forms of relief 
might be available to them.18 IJs play an essential role in filling this void.  
The role of an IJ is quite unlike most judges in other judicial settings—their 
responsibilities extend far beyond fact-finding and adjudicating.19 IJs not only 
determine whether noncitizens are removable,20 they also must determine if a 
noncitizen is statutorily eligible for relief from removal.21 And, IJs have the 
responsibility of deciding whether noncitizens merit favorable grants of 
discretionary relief.22  
                                                                                                                     
 14 Estrada, 876 F.3d at 889.  
 15 Id. at 888.  
 16 See United States v. Santiago-Ochoa, 447 F.3d 1015, 1020 (7th Cir. 2006); 
Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 448 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 
353 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225, 231 (5th 
Cir. 2002); Smith v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 425, 430 (4th Cir. 2002); Oguejiofor v. Att’y Gen., 
277 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2002); Escudero-Corona v. INS, 244 F.3d 608, 615 (8th Cir. 
2001).  
 17 United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2004). Notably, the Second and Ninth Circuits 
collectively resolve nearly three-quarters of all immigration appeals. See Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 6, at 9. 
 18 Esther Yu Hsi Lee, Only 37 Percent of Immigrants Have Legal Representation, 
THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 29, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/immigrants-legal-represent 
ation-39a5f7dbd434/ [https://perma.cc/7NT5-DYTG]. 
 19 See INA § 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2012) (“The immigration judge shall 
administer oaths, receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien 
and any witnesses.”); see also Copeland, 376 F.3d at 71.  
 20 See Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1805 (2013) 
(explaining that removability is a “threshold question of whether the government has legal 
authority to attempt to deport someone”). If a noncitizen contests removability and succeeds, 
the IJ must terminate the proceedings. Id. at 1806. However, there are very few grounds on 
which removal can be contested; for example, noncitizens with colorable claims to U.S. 
citizenship. See id. at 1810. 
 21 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (2012) (requiring IJs to inform aliens of “apparent 
eligibility” for relief and to consider any applications for relief). 
 22 Koh, supra note 20, at 1813.  
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Notably, throughout these proceedings, noncitizens are afforded general 
procedural due process rights.23 However, the majority of federal circuit courts 
stop short of recognizing a procedural due process right to be made aware of 
discretionary relief from removal.24 This is a critical issue because nearly all 
forms of relief from removal are discretionary.25 Essentially, if there is no right 
to be informed of discretionary relief, effectively there is no right to be informed 
of any relief. And realistically, the ability of noncitizens to pursue relief from 
removal and remain in the United States, without a right at least to be made 
aware of relief, is extremely limited. But, beyond this recognition, evaluating 
procedural due process jurisprudence in this context leads to the conclusion that 
deportable LPRs26 have the right to be made aware of their eligibility for relief 
from removal.27  
This Note explores the issue of whether LPRs in removal proceedings have 
a due process right to be made aware of discretionary relief from removal. Part 
II provides a general overview of immigration proceedings and procedural due 
process rights in the immigration context. Part III discusses the circuit split, 
focusing particularly on the Sixth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Estrada 
as the most recent case deepening the split. Part IV discusses LPRs’ liberty 
interests and uses the framework of Mathews v. Eldridge to support the 
                                                                                                                     
 23 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies 
to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is 
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It 
is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in 
deportation proceedings.”).  
 24 See United States v. Santiago-Ochoa, 447 F.3d 1015, 1020 (7th Cir. 2006); 
Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 448 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 
353 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225, 231 (5th 
Cir. 2002); Smith v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 425, 430 (4th Cir. 2002); Oguejiofor v. Att’y Gen., 
277 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2002); Escudero-Corona v. INS, 244 F.3d 608, 615 (8th Cir. 
2001). 
 25 See, e.g., INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012) (asylum); INA 
§ 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012) (waiver of admissibility); INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b (2012) (cancellation of removal). Despite that nearly all forms of relief from 
removal are discretionary, at least one form of relief is not—withholding of removal. See 8 
C.F.R. § 1208.16 (2019). However, withholding of removal provides only a bare minimum 
of relief—the noncitizen avoids deportation to the country where they fear persecution, but 
they have no pathway to LPR status or citizenship, and may be deported to a country other 
than the one from which they were granted withholding of removal. Withholding of Removal 
and CAT, IMMIGR. EQUALITY, https://www.immigrationequality.org/get-legal-help/our-
legal-resources/asylum/withholding-of-removal-and-cat/#.XHBfda2ZPeQ [https://perma 
.cc/657J-D7DQ].  
 26 See INA § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2012) (defining “lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence” as “the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of 
residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the 
immigration laws”).  
 27 LPRs are “the group of noncitizens most likely to have the strongest legal entitlement 
to remain in, as well as the likelihood of having the deepest community ties to, the United 
States.” Johnson, supra note 5, at 2397.  
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argument that LPRs in removal proceedings have a procedural due process right 
to be made aware of discretionary relief from removal by an IJ and briefly 
sketches how to protect this right. Part V briefly concludes that following 
existing procedural due process jurisprudence, LPRs have the right to be made 
aware of their eligibility for discretionary relief from removal.  
II. IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS & DUE PROCESS 
On the most basic level, when the government wants to deport a noncitizen 
it must first initiate removal proceedings in an immigration court, a very 
different setting from an Article III court.28 Removal proceedings are considered 
civil (not criminal) proceedings; thus, many of the constitutional safeguards in 
place in the criminal context for citizens and noncitizens alike do not apply in 
immigration proceedings.29 However, it is now well established that removal 
proceedings must comport with general procedural due process protections.30  
Part II.A provides a brief general overview of removal proceedings. Part 
II.B discusses collateral attacks of prior deportation orders based on due process 
violations.  
                                                                                                                     
 28 Koh, supra note 20, at 1813; United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 
2004) (quoting Yang v. McElroy, 277 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2002)) (“[T]he IJ . . . unlike an 
Article III judge, is not merely the fact finder and adjudicator but also has an obligation to 
establish the record.”).  
 29 See Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1311–
12 (2011) (describing the explicit application of the civil label to deportation proceedings by 
the Supreme Court in 1893). Though the civil label has endured, repeatedly being relied upon 
for a hundred-plus years, Professor Markowitz argues that deportation proceedings are not 
truly civil, nor criminal. Id. at 1301. He argues, instead, that noncitizens’ rights in deportation 
proceedings must be determined by evaluating both constitutional protections afforded in 
criminal proceedings and balancing interests under the Mathews v. Eldridge test used in civil 
proceedings. Id. at 1307; see also Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: 
Why at Least Some of the Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 
ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 309–10 (2000) (noting that courts have held that a person facing 
deportation does not have a constitutionally protected right to the assistance of counsel, the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment are irrelevant, and 
there are no limits to deportation imposed by virtue of the Double Jeopardy Clause). 
Professor Pauw argues that in many cases, deportation is a punishment as a matter of law; it 
is not merely a remedial measure. Id. at 307.  
 30 Pauw, supra note 29, at 310 (citing Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903)) 
(the Court held in Yamataya that the government may not arbitrarily deport an alien without 
giving him or her the right to answer why the deportation is improper); see Hiroshi 
Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for 
Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1632–52 (1992) (discussing the 
evolution of procedural due process rights in immigration proceedings). In 1976, the 
Supreme Court decided Mathews v. Eldridge, establishing the contemporary standard for 
procedural due process inquiries. Id. at 1652. In the immigration context, Landon v. 
Plasencia “marked the arrival of the due process revolution in immigration law.” Id.  
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A. Removal Proceedings  
Immigration removal proceedings involve a two-fold inquiry: (1) whether 
the noncitizen is removable; and, if so, (2) whether the noncitizen qualifies for 
any form of relief from removal.31 First, under the INA, any noncitizen who the 
government wishes to deport must be found removable by an IJ.32 Removability 
is determined through close analysis of various statutory provisions, and the 
applicable definition of removability depends on whether a noncitizen is subject 
to grounds of “inadmissibility” or “deportability.”33 Although the grounds are 
not identical, they each generally describe categories of behavior that can lead 
to removal, including immigration-related offenses, criminal conduct, and 
national security grounds, to name a few.34  
After the IJ has determined that a noncitizen is removable, the second part 
of the inquiry is whether the noncitizen qualifies for any form of relief from 
removal that would allow the noncitizen to remain in the United States.35 There 
are varied forms of relief from removal that a noncitizen may be statutorily 
eligible for, but the forms of relief most relevant for LPRs are cancellation of 
removal for permanent residents36 and waivers of inadmissibility37—the form 
of relief at issue in the circuit split.  
If, following an IJ’s determination that a noncitizen is removable, no 
successful applications for relief from removal are filed, the noncitizen is 
ordered to be removed from the United States.38 A removal order generally 
makes a noncitizen inadmissible for a period of ten or twenty years, depending 
on the circumstances of their removal.39 
                                                                                                                     
 31 Koh, supra note 20, at 1813–14.  
 32 INA § 240(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012).  
 33 See Koh, supra note 20, at 1815. The INA contains the relevant provisions, but they 
are also located in parallel sections in Title 8 of the U.S. Code. This Note cites to both sources 
but refers to forms of relief according to their section in the INA.  
 34 Id. at 1814 (describing “admission” as term of art). A noncitizen is admitted only 
after inspection by an immigration officer; if a noncitizen was admitted and then put in 
removal proceedings, deportability grounds apply. Id. However, noncitizens who enter 
without inspection by an immigration officer and then are put in removal proceedings are 
generally subject to inadmissibility grounds. Id. Though the grounds for removal are similar, 
they contain some differences in impermissible conduct that render noncitizens removable. 
Id. at 1815.  
 35 Id. at 1813–14.  
 36 INA § 240(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). An alien who has been lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence for not less than five years, has resided in the United States 
continuously for seven years after having been admitted, and has not been convicted of any 
aggravated felony, is eligible for cancellation of removal. Id.  
 37 INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012).  
 38 INA § 240(c)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (“At the conclusion of the 
proceeding the immigration judge shall decide whether an alien is removable from the United 
States.”).  
 39 Removal not as an arriving alien bars a noncitizen from admission for ten years. INA 
§ 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I). Removal for an aggravated felony or 
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B. Collateral Attacks Based on Due Process Violations  
For some noncitizens, being deported ends their connection to the United 
States, but many LPRs like Mr. Estrada in particular, leave behind spouses, 
children, parents, and other loved ones.40 And, because noncitizens who have 
been deported generally face at least a ten-year bar on lawful entry to the United 
States, many noncitizens attempt to re-enter unlawfully.41 When a noncitizen 
re-enters after a removal order, they face harsh penalties and have few possible 
grounds to defend against the charge of illegal re-entry.42 One of the few 
available defenses under these circumstances is to collaterally attack the prior 
removal order on the ground that there was a due process violation in the earlier 
proceeding.43 In order to succeed on a collateral attack, the noncitizen must 
demonstrate that they (1) exhausted administrative remedies, (2) that the 
underlying proceedings “improperly deprived” them of judicial review, and (3) 
that “entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.”44  
                                                                                                                     
after a previous removal order bars a noncitizen from admission for twenty years. INA 
§ 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II).  
 40 LPRs are particularly likely to have family members in the United States because 
many LPRs are eligible for that status on the basis of a family relationship. See ALEINIKOFF 
ET AL., supra note 13, at 271 (“The highest numbers of immigrant admissions are based on 
family ties. . . . [They are] based on specified relationships to citizens or lawful permanent 
residents.”).  
 41 Under INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I), a noncitizen who 
was previously ordered removed, not as an arriving alien, is barred from admission for ten 
years. INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I). A noncitizen who has two 
previous removal orders or was removed on the basis of an aggravated felony conviction is 
barred from admission for twenty years. Id.; see also Mendez, supra note 2 (discussing the 
high rate of federal prosecutions for unlawful re-entry).  
 42 See Doug Keller, Re-Thinking Illegal Entry and Re-Entry, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 65, 
115 (2012). The statutory criminal penalty for unlawful re-entry after a prior removal is two 
years or less in prison, but if the noncitizen was previously removed due to a criminal 
conviction, the noncitizen could face between ten to twenty years. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a)(2)–
(b)(2) (2012). From an immigration standpoint, unlawful re-entry after a prior removal leads 
to a permanent bar to admission to the United States. See INA § 212(a)(9)(C), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(9)(C).  
 43 Keller, supra note 42, at 116; see also Koh, supra note 20, at 1819 (discussing that a 
noncitizen may seek to collaterally attack a prior removal order not only as a defense to 
deportation, but also to avoid sentencing enhancements in the illegal re-entry context).  
 44 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). The Supreme Court held in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 
U.S. 828, 837–38 (1987), that in a criminal re-entry prosecution, a collateral attack on the 
earlier deportation order is allowed when the prior proceeding was fundamentally unfair, and 
the respondent was effectively denied the opportunity for meaningful judicial review. 
Congress essentially codified Mendoza-Lopez in 1996, establishing the three-factor standard 
found in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). The circuit courts, however, continue to apply varying standards 
to determine whether the noncitizen was prejudiced or prevented from obtaining meaningful 
judicial review. For a survey of circuit decisions on this issue, see IRA J. KURZBAN, 
KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 310–19 (2014).  
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The Supreme Court case, United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, which 
established the three-part test for collateral attacks on prior deportation orders, 
also provides an example of a due process violation that led to a successful 
collateral attack.45 In Mendoza-Lopez, the IJ had improperly told Mr. Mendoza-
Lopez that no relief was available, leading him to waive his right to seek relief 
and waive his appeal rights.46 As a result, Mr. Mendoza-Lopez was able to 
successfully attack his prior deportation order because the proceedings did not 
comport with due process.47 Another example of a due process violation that led 
to a successful collateral attack was the denial of the right to counsel coupled 
with the failure to advise a noncitizen of his rights in a language he could 
understand.48 
Some noncitizens are deported even though they would have been eligible 
for relief from removal because they were not made aware of their eligibility for 
relief. But noncitizens who attack prior deportation orders in a subsequent 
proceeding on this basis seldom succeed. Collateral attacks under these 
circumstances have proven to be nearly impossible because the majority of 
circuit courts do not recognize a due process violation, as will be discussed in 
Part III. Thus, noncitizens cannot establish that the deportation order was 
“fundamentally unfair.”49  
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT: DUE PROCESS & DISCRETIONARY RELIEF FROM 
REMOVAL 
The federal circuit courts are split over whether noncitizens in removal 
proceedings have a due process right to be made aware of discretionary relief 
from removal.50 The majority of circuit courts have held that there is no 
                                                                                                                     
 45 Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 839–40. 
 46 Id.  
 47 Id. at 837.  
 48 See United States v. Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d 1036, 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that although the noncitizen’s due process rights were violated in his prior removal 
proceedings, he could not demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the violations, thus 
his prior removal order was not fundamentally unfair).  
 49 See Brent S. Wible, The Strange Afterlife of Section 212(C) Relief: Collateral Attacks 
on Deportation Orders in Prosecutions for Illegal Reentry After St. Cyr, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 455, 465–66 (2005) (“[T]he majority of circuits, while allowing collateral attacks in 
section 1326 prosecutions . . . find that no due process violation exists in a deportation 
proceeding if the IJ erroneously failed to consider an alien’s eligibility for discretionary 
relief.”).  
 50 See supra Part I. Although the form of discretionary relief at issue in most of the 
circuit cases, Section 212(c) relief, is different from the discretionary relief at issue in 
Estrada, Section 212(h) relief, the distinction is irrelevant for the purposes of evaluating 
procedural due process rights because both forms of relief are available only to LPRs, or 
those applying to be LPRs. See IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., IMMIGRATION RELIEF TOOLKIT 
FOR CRIMINAL DEFENDERS 11, 23 (July 2018), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/ 
resources/relief_toolkit-20180827.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7M6-CYSY]. In contrast, if 
one of the forms of relief at issue was not available to LPRs, the procedural due process 
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protectable liberty or property interest in being informed of discretionary relief, 
because it is discretionary.51 Thus, the majority of circuits have rejected that due 
process violations occur when IJs or counsel fail to inform noncitizens of their 
eligibility for discretionary relief.52 A minority of circuit courts, however, have 
recognized a due process right to be made aware of discretionary relief from 
removal.53 The right is recognized because these courts have found a protectable 
liberty or property interest in being made aware of the relief—they distinguish 
between a right to be granted relief, which is wholly discretionary, from a right 
to be informed of the relief, which is not.54 The circuit courts have long been 
divided on this issue, but with the Sixth Circuit’s recent holding in United States 
v. Estrada,55 the issue has received renewed attention.56 Notably, none of the 
circuit court decisions distinguish between LPRs and other noncitizens in terms 
of due process protections.57  
                                                                                                                     
analysis would be impacted because LPRs may have a cognizable liberty interest that 
noncitizens do not. See infra Part IV.A. Notably, Section 212(c) and Section 212(h) relief 
likely occupy the circuit split due to their complexity—the more complex the relief, the more 
likely the failure to advise noncitizens of their eligibility. Section 212(c) relief has a 
particularly vexing history. In 1996, Congress amended the INA and eliminated Section 
212(c) relief, but five years later the Supreme Court held in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 
(2001) that the amendment did not eliminate the retroactivity of the relief. Wible, supra note 
49, at 455 (explaining that INS v. St. Cyr overturned an earlier Attorney General opinion, 
which had come to the opposite conclusion). Relief under Section 212(c) remains a viable 
form of discretionary relief for noncitizens whose removable conviction occurred prior to 
1996, but it occupied a space of considerable ambiguity before INS v. St. Cyr. Id. at 455–56.  
 51 See infra Part III.  
 52 See United States v. Santiago-Ochoa, 447 F.3d 1015, 1020 (7th Cir. 2006); 
Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 448 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 
353 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225, 231 (5th 
Cir. 2002); Smith v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 425, 430 (4th Cir. 2002); Oguejiofor v. Att’y Gen., 
277 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2002); Escudero-Corona v. INS, 244 F.3d 608, 615 (8th Cir. 
2001). 
 53 See United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 54 See, e.g., Copeland, 376 F.3d at 71.  
 55 United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885 (6th Cir. 2017).  
 56 See Amona Al-Refaei, Undocumented Immigrants Right to Discretionary Relief, U. 
CIN. L. REV. BLOG (Aug. 15, 2018), https://uclawreview.org/2018/08/15/undocumented-
immigrants-right-to-discretionary-relief/ [https://perma.cc/3CPJ-AAU4]; Rashmi Borah, Do 
Potential Deportees Have a Constitutional Right to Be Made Aware of Discretionary Relief 
from Removal?, SUNDAY SPLITS (Jan. 29, 2018), http://sundaysplits.com/2018/01/29/do-
potential-deportees-have-a-constitutional-right-to-be-made-aware-of-discretionary-relief 
-from-removal/ [https://perma.cc/JUY7-68PT]; Colleen Fitzharris, No Right to Try, SIXTH 
CIR. BLOG (Dec. 6, 2017), http://circuit6.blogspot.com/2017/12/no-right-to-try.html 
[https://perma.cc/X93Z-R5E6]. 
 57 See Estrada, 876 F.3d 885 (failing to distinguish between LPRs and other noncitizens 
in terms of procedural due process rights in removal proceedings); Lopez-Velasquez, 629 
F.3d 894 (same); Santiago-Ochoa, 447 F.3d 1015 (same); Bonhometre, 414 F.3d 442 (same); 
Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (same); Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199 (same); Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 
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A. The Sixth Circuit Holds There Is No Due Process Right to Be Made 
Aware of Discretionary Relief: United States v. Estrada 
When Mr. Estrada was deported to Mexico, he left behind his wife, four 
children, and a life he had built for nearly twenty years in the United States.58 
As a result of his deportation and the criminal conviction it was based on, he 
was barred from lawfully re-entering the United States for a period of twenty 
years.59 When he re-entered unlawfully, he faced charges for illegal re-entry, 
but he presented a reasonable defense—that the failure of his attorney and the 
IJ to inform him that he had been eligible for Section 212(h) discretionary relief 
rendered his prior deportation order invalid.60 Mr. Estrada argued that the prior 
deportation order was “fundamentally unfair” because he had been deprived of 
due process.61  
The Sixth Circuit rejected Mr. Estrada’s claim that his deportation order had 
been fundamentally unfair.62 The court held that no due process violation could 
be established because there is no cognizable liberty or property interest in being 
made aware of discretionary relief, because the relief itself is discretionary.63 
Having concluded there was no liberty or property interest, the court did not 
evaluate whether Mr. Estrada was denied any process he should have been 
due.64 As a result, the failure of counsel or the IJ to inform Mr. Estrada during 
his removal hearing that he was eligible for relief was condoned as an acceptable 
proceeding resulting in a valid deportation order.65 Mr. Estrada was not able to 
meet the burden of proof required to collaterally attack his prior deportation 
order; he was left defenseless in his federal prosecution for unlawful re-entry.66 
The Sixth Circuit’s holding reflects a refusal to distinguish between a grant 
of relief, which is discretionary, and the right to be made aware of eligibility for 
                                                                                                                     
225 (same); Smith, 295 F.3d 425 (same); Oguejiofor, 277 F.3d 1305 (same); Escudero-
Corona, 244 F.3d 608 (same).  
 58 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 6, at 1. 
 59 INA § 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II) (2012) (outlining that a 
noncitizen who was removed on the basis of an aggravated felony conviction is barred from 
seeking admission to the United States for twenty years).  
 60 Brief for Appellant, supra note 8, at 10. 
 61 In order to attack his prior deportation order, Mr. Estrada needed to satisfy the three 
requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), but the bulk of the problem is in demonstrating that the 
prior order was fundamentally unfair. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.  
 62 Estrada, 876 F.3d at 887 (“To prove the fundamental unfairness of an underlying 
deportation order, a defendant must show both a due process violation emanating from 
defects in the underlying deportation proceeding and resulting prejudice.”).  
 63 Id. at 888.  
 64 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 6, at 8. 
 65 See id.  
 66 Estrada, 876 F.3d at 886.  
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relief.67 To contextualize this issue, Mr. Estrada argued he would have qualified 
in 2009 for a form of discretionary relief that authorizes a waiver of 
inadmissibility based on criminal convictions, if certain requirements are met.68 
One such requirement is a showing of extreme hardship to a parent, spouse, or 
child, who is either a U.S. citizen or LPR.69 To receive Section 212(h) relief, a 
noncitizen must be statutorily eligible,70 but that alone is not enough. The IJ 
must also determine that the noncitizen is deserving of a grant of relief.71 These 
two elements are separate inquiries—meeting threshold criteria, on the one 
hand, and meriting a favorable grant of discretion within the opinion of the IJ, 
on the other.72 In contrast to the Sixth Circuit, a minority of circuit courts have 
found the distinction to be relevant for recognizing a due process right.73  
B. Minority Circuits Recognize the Right to Be Made Aware of 
Discretionary Relief from Removal 
The minority circuit courts have recognized a cognizable liberty or property 
interest in being made aware of discretionary relief from removal, which the 
                                                                                                                     
 67 The Second Circuit, in contrast, distinguished between a grant of discretionary relief 
and an interest in being made aware of discretionary relief from removal. United States v. 
Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 71–72 (2d Cir. 2004).  
 68 INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012). There was some dispute between the 
parties as to whether Mr. Estrada would have qualified for Section 212(h) relief at the time 
of his deportation order. Brief for Appellant, supra note 8, at 17–18; cf. Brief for Appellee 
at 14–15, United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885 (6th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-5081). Prior to 
2008, the consensus among courts was that noncitizens with aggravated felony convictions 
were generally not eligible for Section 212(h) relief. Brief for Appellant, supra note 8, at 18. 
However, the Fifth Circuit ruled in Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 546 (5th Cir. 2008), 
that for noncitizens “who adjust post-entry to LPR status, [Section] 212(h)’s plain language 
demonstrates unambiguously Congress’ intent not to bar them from seeking a waiver of 
inadmissibility.” This ruling came out about one year prior to Mr. Estrada’s deportation 
hearing. Thus, Mr. Estrada was eligible for Section 212(h) relief under relevant federal 
precedent because he had adjusted to LPR status in the United States, and his deportation 
hearing took place in a Louisiana Immigration Court. Brief for Appellant, supra note 8, at 
17–19; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW: AN 
AGENCY GUIDE 1 (Dec. 2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/eoir_an_agency 
_guide/download [https://perma.cc/6KM3-3B63] (“The federal circuit courts 
may . . . issue precedent decisions on immigration law issues that are then controlling in that 
particular federal circuit.”). 
 69 INA § 212(h)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B).  
 70 A noncitizen is statutorily eligible for Section 212 relief if they can prove that a 
parent, spouse, son, or daughter, who is a U.S. citizen or an LPR, would suffer extreme 
hardship if the waiver were denied. INA § 212(h)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B).  
 71 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 13, at 725–26.  
 72 See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the two separate components 
for most forms of relief in the INA).  
 73 See infra Part III.B. The Supreme Court has also explicitly distinguished between 
eligibility for relief and favorable grant of such relief. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 307–
08 (2001).  
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majority circuit courts have refused to recognize.74 In United States v. 
Copeland, the Second Circuit explained that the majority circuit courts have 
refused to recognize the existence of a cognizable interest in this context based 
on reasoning used in Section 1983 cases concerning discretionary actions taken 
by state actors.75 Generally these cases hold that if the official action at issue is 
discretionary under state law, there is no property right that requires procedural 
due process protection.76 But, as the Second Circuit noted, this framework is not 
pertinent in the removal context because, although the granting of relief is 
discretionary, the right to be considered for the relief is not.77  
The Ninth Circuit, unlike the Second Circuit, has not explicitly stated that 
there is a cognizable liberty or property interest at stake with respect to 
noncitizens’ removal proceedings.78 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has held 
that IJs have a duty to inform noncitizens of discretionary relief from removal 
when there is a reasonable possibility that they are eligible for the relief.79 And, 
the court has also held that IJs violate noncitizens’ due process rights when they 
provide incorrect information about the noncitizens’ right to seek discretionary 
relief or appeal their deportation order when they were in fact eligible for 
discretionary relief.80 Thus, the Ninth Circuit has implicitly recognized the 
existence of a cognizable liberty or property interest, even when the relief at 
issue is discretionary.81  
                                                                                                                     
 74 See, e.g., United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 71–72 (2d Cir. 2004); cf. United 
States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 888 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Appiah v. INS, 202 F.3d 704, 
709 (4th Cir. 2000)) (holding that when “suspension of deportation is discretionary, it does 
not create a protectable liberty or property interest”).  
 75 Copeland, 376 F.3d at 71 (referring to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
government officials).  
 76 In Section 1983 cases, courts look at whether government benefits or employment 
are discretionary to determine whether there is a due process right to a hearing before the 
benefits or employment can be terminated. Id. at 72. If the official action at issue is 
discretionary, according to state law, “one’s interest in a favorable decision does not rise to 
the level of a property right entitled to procedural due process protection.” Id. (citation 
omitted).  
 77 Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 212.3(e)(1)) (“The decisions holding 
that a failure to inform an alien about Section 212(c) relief cannot be a fundamental 
error . . . incorrectly assume that, because the grant of Section 212(c) relief is itself 
discretionary, the denial of a Section 212(c) hearing cannot be a fundamental procedural 
error.”). 
 78 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(failing to mention whether there is a liberty or property interest); United States v. Ubaldo-
Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2004) (same).  
 79 Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 895.  
 80 Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at 1048 (holding that the noncitizen’s due process rights 
were violated because the IJ did not inform him that he had a right to appeal his removal 
order).  
 81 See infra notes 92–93 and accompanying text (discussing that in procedural due 
process jurisprudence, the threshold question is whether there is a liberty or property interest 
under the Due Process Clause, and only if such an interest exists will courts consider what 
process is due).  
124 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:1 
Having found a cognizable liberty or property interest that gives rise to a 
due process right, both the Second and Ninth Circuit courts have held that this 
right is violated when the IJ fails to make a noncitizen aware of their eligibility 
for discretionary relief from removal.82 In Copeland, the Second Circuit held 
that the IJ’s failure to inform a noncitizen of his right to seek discretionary 
Section 212(c) relief was a procedural error in violation of the noncitizen’s due 
process rights.83 The violation would render the deportation order 
fundamentally unfair so long as the noncitizen was prejudiced by the IJ’s 
failure.84 The court recognized that:  
Given that IJs have a duty to develop the administrative record, and that many 
aliens are uncounselled, our removal system relies on IJs to explain the law 
accurately to pro se aliens. Otherwise, such aliens would have no way of 
knowing what information was relevant to their cases and would be practically 
foreclosed from making a case against removal.85 
In United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
although the noncitizen’s due process rights were not violated in that case, IJs 
generally have a duty to inform noncitizens of relief if there is a reasonable 
possibility that the noncitizen is eligible for relief at the time of the hearing.86 
Mr. Lopez-Velasquez’s due process rights were not violated by the IJ’s failure 
to inform him of Section 212(c) relief, however, because he was not statutorily 
eligible for the relief at the time of his deportation hearing.87 Instead, on 
collateral attack, Mr. Lopez-Velasquez argued that had he been made aware of 
the relief during his removal proceedings, he could have made a colorable claim 
that he had sufficient residence in the United States to qualify for the relief.88 
Under the circumstances, the court found that the IJ had no duty to inform Mr. 
Lopez-Velasquez of relief for which he was not eligible.89 Nevertheless, the 
court was explicit in stating that, “where the record demonstrates, or at least 
                                                                                                                     
 82 Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 897; United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 71 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (holding that failure to advise potential deportee of a right to seek Section 212(c) 
relief can, if prejudicial, be fundamentally unfair); United States v. Sosa, 387 F.3d 131 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (same); Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at 1042 (same). 
 83 Copeland, 376 F.3d at 75. 
 84 See id. at 62 (remanding the case for further findings on whether the noncitizen had 
been prejudiced).  
 85 Id. at 71.  
 86 Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 895.  
 87 See id. at 897.  
 88 Id. Under the law at the time of Mr. Lopez-Velasquez’s deportation hearing, 
Section 212(c) had a seven-year domicile requirement, defined as beginning when the 
noncitizen was granted LPR status. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 
1996). Mr. Lopez-Velasquez had only been an LPR for three years at the time of his hearing, 
however he contended he would have had a colorable claim based on the timing of an earlier 
application for status he filed. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 896. Nevertheless, he still would 
not have satisfied the domicile requirement. Id. 
 89 Id. at 899.  
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implies, a factual basis for relief, the IJ’s duty is triggered.”90 But, when there 
is no factual basis for relief in the record, the Ninth Circuit has held that there is 
no due process violation if the IJ does not notify the noncitizen of a right to 
apply for relief.91  
The majority of circuits reject that the failure of an IJ or counsel to inform 
a noncitizen of their eligibility for discretionary relief from removal constitutes 
a due process violation. A minority of circuit courts disagree and have 
concluded that such a failure may violate a noncitizen’s due process rights. The 
courts on both sides of the split, however, have not adequately addressed the 
threshold question in procedural due process inquiries—whether there is a 
cognizable liberty or property interest. Additionally, none of the circuit courts 
have attempted to draw distinctions between LPRs and other noncitizens in 
answering this threshold question. Part IV will engage in this analysis and then 
will balance the relevant interests to determine what process is due, assuming 
the existence of a cognizable interest.  
IV. RECOGNIZING A DUE PROCESS RIGHT ON BALANCE: MATHEWS V. 
ELDRIDGE AND THE RIGHT TO BE MADE AWARE OF DISCRETIONARY 
RELIEF 
Procedural due process inquiries begin with the question of whether a 
claimant possesses a “liberty” or “property” interest under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.92 The next step is to determine what process 
is due.93 In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court set forth a balancing test 
to determine whether administrative adjudications conform to procedural due 
process protections.94 In order to determine what process is due, the Court called 
for a balancing of private interests, the probable value of additional or substitute 
safeguards, and the government’s interests, including the burden of imposing 
the procedural requirement.95 
LPRs in removal proceedings, like Mr. Estrada, may never be informed that 
they are eligible for discretionary relief from removal. This presents a 
                                                                                                                     
 90 Id. at 900 (noting that, if the record reveals the noncitizen is an immediate relative of 
a U.S. citizen or an LPR, this triggers the IJ’s duty to inform the alien of possible relief based 
on that relationship).  
 91 Valencia v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1261, 1262 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the IJ was 
not required to advise a noncitizen of her right to apply for asylum when there was no reason 
to think she would have qualified for asylum). This distinction raises another issue. Because 
IJs have the responsibility to develop the record when the record is inadequately developed, 
the IJ may not realize that the noncitizen is eligible for relief and thus not inform them of 
such. This Note, however, does not make a separate procedural due process argument about 
developing the record because this is already required by the statute. INA § 240(b)(1), 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2012).  
 92 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 13, at 543.  
 93 Id. at 544.  
 94 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 95 Id.  
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procedural due process issue that must be addressed. First, Part IV.A argues that 
LPRs have a cognizable liberty interest at stake because LPRs rely upon the 
permanency of their statuses, which are reinforced through social and legal 
expectations. Next, Part IV.B applies the Mathews v. Eldridge test to argue that 
LPRs in removal proceedings, on balance, are due the process of being made 
aware of their eligibility for relief. Lastly, Part IV.C argues that the due process 
right to be made aware of discretionary relief translates to a duty of IJs to 
personally inform noncitizens of their eligibility for relief. Although one 
approach would be to recognize this duty as belonging to the attorney-client 
relationship, this Note argues that in order to fully address the problem, the duty 
can only properly attach to IJs.  
A. Lawful Permanent Residents Have a Cognizable Liberty Interest 
Although the circuit courts have not distinguished between LPRs and other 
noncitizens in deciding whether a cognizable liberty interest exists to be made 
aware of discretionary relief, such a distinction is significant. To draw this 
distinction, LPR status must first be defined. In statutory terms, LPRs “hav[e] 
been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United 
States as . . . immigrant[s] in accordance with the immigration laws, such status 
not having [been] changed.”96 To obtain this status, a noncitizen must fall within 
a class of admission designated in the INA—the largest of which is based on a 
close familial connection to a U.S. citizen or LPR.97 Once LPR status is attained, 
it confers responsibilities akin to citizenship—the “ability to reside and work in 
the United States, the responsibility to pay taxes, and the duty to register for 
selective service under the Military Selective Service Act”—and is, in fact, the 
status immediately preceding U.S. citizenship.98  
Based on this special status, scholars have argued that LPRs have a liberty 
interest under the Due Process Clause that noncitizens without permanent status 
do not.99 This argument is based on an understanding of the permanency of LPR 
                                                                                                                     
 96 INA § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2012). 
 97 See U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, Chapter 2−Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) 
Admission for Naturalization, in USCIS POLICY MANUAL: VOLUME 12−CITIZENSHIP AND 
NATURALIZATION (2020), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12-part-d-chapter-
2 [https://perma.cc/V9BX-B2K6]; WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RES. SER., U.S. FAMILY-
BASED IMMIGRATION POLICY (Feb. 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43145.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4MH5-8KC5] (“Of the 1,183,505 foreign nationals admitted to the United 
States in FY2016 as lawful permanent residents (LPRs), 804,793, or 68%, were admitted on 
the basis of family ties.”).  
 98 Maritza I. Reyes, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law: The Vital Role of Judicial 
Discretion in the Removal of Lawful Permanent Residents, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 637, 643–44 
(2012) (footnotes omitted) (“For all intents and purposes, lawful permanent residents bear 
the same duties in American society as U.S. citizens.”). 
 99 See Johnson, supra note 5, at 2397, 2414 (arguing that ordinary due process 
jurisprudence favors recognizing guaranteed counsel for LPRs because they have the 
strongest legal entitlement to remain in the United States of all noncitizens in removal 
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status that the statute itself does not bear out.100 Instead, the argument follows 
from a social and expectation-based understanding that, as LPRs establish ties 
that go with permanent residence, “they shift their expectations about where 
home is,” and “chart out life plans in reliance on enduring rights to remain.”101 
But it is not merely a matter of social expectation; this understanding is also 
based on consistent governmental practices setting LPRs apart from other 
noncitizens.102 For example, only LPRs are eligible to petition to naturalize and 
become citizens of the United States.103 Immigration law also favors LPRs in 
seeking relief from removal.104 
The argument follows that the social expectations and government practices 
treating LPRs as permanent status holders, distinct from other noncitizens, 
essentially create a reliance interest for LPRs.105 Although the INA establishes 
offenses that make LPRs removable notwithstanding their permanent status,106 
considering this status more fully, a liberty interest based on reliance is 
cognizable.  
The Second Circuit’s analysis in Copeland, without more explanation on 
why noncitizens have a liberty interest in being informed of their eligibility for 
discretionary relief from removal, is left wanting.107 Additionally, the majority 
                                                                                                                     
proceedings); David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for 
Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 47, 49, 
105 (Dennis S. Hutchinson et al. eds., 2001) (arguing that LPRs should enjoy due process 
constitutional protections on par with citizens because of reliance on both legal and social 
determinations).  
 100 The INA sets forth express conditions that will terminate permanent residence and 
render a noncitizen deportable, criminal convictions among them. INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a) (2012).  
 101 Martin, supra note 99, at 102, 104.  
 102 See id. at 104 (noting that the “permanent” label is placed on official documents and 
on the very card issued to LPRs by the government). 
 103 Johnson, supra note 5, at 2405 (“U.S. immigration laws in many respects favor 
lawful permanent residents over other categories of noncitizens.”).  
 104 For example, to qualify for cancellation of removal, LPRs need to satisfy fewer years 
of residence in the United States compared to other noncitizens. Compare INA § 240A(a)(2), 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2) (2012) (seven years of residence for LPRs), with INA 
§ 240A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (2012) (ten years of residence for non-LPRs). 
 105 Although arising under different circumstances, not based in statutory authority, the 
recent lawsuits concerning Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) have 
considered arguments that deferred action created a reliance interest for beneficiaries. See 
NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 240 (D.D.C. 2018) (stating that the creation of 
DACA engendered “the reliance of hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries, many of whom 
had structured their education, employment, and other life activities on the assumption that 
they would be able to renew their DACA benefits.”).  
 106 See Koh, supra note 20, at 1815 (discussing that LPRs are generally subject to 
deportability grounds under Section 237, but may face removal under the Section 212 
grounds for inadmissibility “if, for instance, they traveled abroad and sought re-admission at 
the border”).  
 107 See supra Part III.B (discussing the Second Circuit’s holding in Copeland that 
noncitizens have a liberty or property interest under the Due Process Clause).  
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of circuits deny that such an interest exists without even discussing whether 
LPRs in particular may have such an interest.108 But this interest is discernable 
if lawful permanent residency is understood more fully than its statutory 
definition. Finding such an interest is, of course, only the first step. Whether 
proceedings in which the IJ does not make an LPR aware of their eligibility for 
discretionary relief from removal meet adequate due process must be answered 
through the Mathews v. Eldridge framework.  
B. Procedural Due Process Balancing Test 
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court set forth a balancing test that is 
now the dominant approach through which courts evaluate whether federal and 
state administrative adjudications comport with the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ Due Process Clause guarantees.109 This balancing test has 
previously been employed to evaluate due process claims in the immigration 
context.110 To determine what process is due, the Mathews test involves an 
evaluation and balancing of three factors:  
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
                                                                                                                     
 108 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.  
 109 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Ramanujan Nadadur, Note, Beyond 
“Crimigration” and the Civil-Criminal Dichotomy—Applying Mathews v. Eldridge in the 
Immigration Context, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 141, 148 (2013). Although Mathews 
v. Eldridge traditionally provides the framework for analyzing due process claims in the 
context of administrative adjudications, it has also been applied to adjudicate criminal 
procedural rights. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631, 633 (2002) (using 
Mathews to evaluate whether the state was constitutionally required to disclose material 
impeachment evidence prior to a plea agreement with a criminal defendant). The Supreme 
Court has also applied the balancing test in civil proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. 
James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (applying the test to a civil case 
involving the state’s seizure of property under a forfeiture statute). For a further analysis of 
instances in which courts have applied Mathews, see Nadadur, supra note 109, at 152–53 
(surveying other categories of cases where Mathews has been applied).  
 110 In Landon v. Plasencia, the Supreme Court held that returning LPRs—those who 
have left the United States and then seek re-admission—have due process rights available to 
them in exclusion proceedings. 459 U.S. 21, 34–36 (1982). Historically, immigration 
proceedings consisted of two distinct forms: exclusion—for arriving aliens, with fewer 
procedural protections available—and, deportation proceedings, which afforded greater 
procedural protections. Id. at 25. Thus, recognizing procedural protections in exclusion 
proceedings demonstrated an expansion of due process protections in the immigration 
context. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 5, at 2404 (noting that the Supreme Court applied the 
Mathews v. Eldridge test in a “pathbreaking decision” in Landon v. Plasencia); Motomura, 
supra note 30, at 1652 (discussing Plasencia as “mark[ing] the arrival of the due process 
revolution in immigration law”).  
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involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.111 
This section will consider each factor in turn and ultimately argue that on 
balance, LPRs are due the process of being informed of their eligibility for 
discretionary relief.  
1. LPRs Have an Individual Interest in Being Informed of Their 
Eligibility for Relief 
Generally, noncitizens in removal proceedings have considerable individual 
interests in being informed of their eligibility for discretionary relief because 
this information directly impacts their ability to remain in the United States. The 
interest can be cast in different ways—very narrowly, as a right to remain, or 
more generally, as an interest born out of family ties, property, and the life the 
noncitizen established in the United States.112 Though the relative strength of 
the individual interest may vary for each noncitizen in removal,113 some base 
level of interest undoubtedly exists given what is at stake—removal from a 
country where someone seeks to remain.114  
In Landon v. Plasencia, a groundbreaking decision recognizing due process 
protections for noncitizens, the Supreme Court identified individual interests for 
LPRs that include family ties, property, and a life created in the United States.115 
The Court recognized that Mrs. Plasencia’s interest in staying, living, working, 
and rejoining her immediate family in the United States were important and 
high-ranking individual interests.116  
Another way of conceptualizing what is at stake, which the Supreme Court 
has done on several occasions, is the right to be free from banishment.117 
                                                                                                                     
 111 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 112 Nadadur, supra note 109, at 153 (arguing that the strength of the procedural right 
may depend on how the individual interest is cast, with the more general conception favoring 
stronger procedural rights).  
 113 Other lines could be drawn between groups of noncitizens’ varied interests in seeking 
discretionary relief. For example, certain noncitizens are subject to expedited removal. 
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 13, at 947 (explaining that arriving aliens and those 
apprehended within 100 miles of the border within fourteen days of entry are subject to 
expedited removal proceedings). In theory, noncitizens who are subject to expedited removal 
have a lesser interest in remaining in the United States due to their short presence in the 
United States.  
 114 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (“Though deportation is not technically 
a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the 
right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom.”). 
 115 Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34. 
 116 Id. (categorizing Plasencia’s individual interest as a “weighty one”).  
 117 The Supreme Court has recognized that deportation can be “the equivalent of 
banishment or exile.” Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); see also INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (“Deportation is always a harsh measure; it is 
all the more replete with danger when the alien makes a claim that he or she will be subject 
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Though not always the case, many noncitizens who are removed are forced to 
start over in a country where they have no family, may not speak the language, 
and may face serious persecution or even death.118 Understanding the individual 
interests to be such, the stakes are high, but they are especially “weighty” for 
LPRs, who have permanent status that they retain indefinitely, unless they 
commit a removable offense or naturalize.119  
The first factor of the Mathews test requires a consideration of the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action.120 The individual interests in 
being made aware of eligibility for discretionary relief from removal potentially 
could take many forms, including the right to be reunited with family or be free 
from banishment. But, however the individual interests are cast, they are 
undoubtedly weighty. 
2. There Is a High Risk of an Erroneous Deprivation of Individual 
Interests 
The second Mathews v. Eldridge factor that demands analysis in this context 
is whether the absence of the right to be made aware of discretionary relief will 
generally, instead of infrequently, affect the outcome of removal 
proceedings.121 Without being made aware of eligibility for discretionary relief 
from removal, there is a serious risk that noncitizens will be erroneously 
deprived of the legal right to be considered for any relief from removal in 
deportation proceedings for three reasons: the well-recognized complexity of 
immigration law,122 the widespread lack of counsel in removal proceedings,123 
                                                                                                                     
to death or persecution if forced to return to his or her home country.”). Deportation, even 
when no fear of persecution is present, is recognized as a “particularly severe penalty.” Alina 
Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical Analysis 
in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1671–73 (2011) (summarizing case law on 
the subject).  
 118 Markowitz, supra note 29, at 1301–02; see also Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the 
Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration 
Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 295, 313–23, 338, 346 (2008) 
(discussing the serious deprivation of liberty that accompanies deportation and discussing 
the history of “banishment” as form of criminal punishment).  
 119 See Johnson, supra note 5, at 2405. Family and/or employment ties are likely to be 
pertinent for LPRs because familial and employment relationships are frequently the basis 
on which LPRs obtain that status. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.  
 120 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 121 Id.  
 122 See, e.g., Markowitz, supra note 29, at 1302; Nadadur, supra note 109, at 141–42; 
see also Stuart Anderson, Only Takes 2,000 (or 3,000) Pages to Explain U.S. Immigration 
Rules, FORBES (July 24, 2011), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2011/07/ 
24/only-takes-2000-or-3000-pages-to-explain-u-s-immigration-rules/#2d74045c67db 
[https://perma.cc/55DN-9U35] (explaining the complexity of immigration law).  
 123 Ingrid Eagly & Steven Shafer, Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, AM. IMMIGR. 
COUNCIL (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/access-
counsel-immigration-court [https://perma.cc/RJ4W-5S35] (estimating that nationally only 
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and the fact that nearly all relief from removal is discretionary.124 Additionally, 
substitute procedural safeguards are inadequate.  
Immigration law is notoriously complicated. The INA has been said to be 
“second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity.”125 Given the 
complexity, having an attorney to navigate and advise in the process is crucial, 
yet most noncitizens face removal proceedings without the assistance of 
counsel.126 Despite frequent and numerous calls for government-appointed 
counsel in removal proceedings, such a right remains elusive.127 Because most 
noncitizens are unrepresented in removal proceedings, IJs’ responsibilities to 
consider noncitizens’ eligibility for relief from removal is ever more important.  
Additionally, nearly all forms of relief from removal are discretionary.128 
Effectively, if there is no right to be informed of discretionary relief, there is no 
right to be informed of relief at all. Therefore, not recognizing a right to be made 
aware of discretionary relief from removal means there is a serious risk that 
noncitizens will be erroneously deprived of their potential right to remain—they 
have no other hope for relief.  
The second factor in the Mathews test also requires consideration of the 
probable value, if any, of substitute procedural safeguards.129 An alternative 
procedural safeguard—instead of requiring IJs to inform noncitizens of their 
eligibility for relief—would be to provide noncitizens with written materials 
                                                                                                                     
37% of non-detained noncitizens in removal proceedings have counsel, and that only 14% 
of detained noncitizens have counsel).  
 124 See, e.g., INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012) (asylum); INA 
§ 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012) (waiver of admissibility); INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(a) (2012) (cancellation of removal). Of course, the right to be made aware of relief 
is distinct from actually being granted discretionary relief, and the Supreme Court has 
explicitly separated these notions. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 307–08 (2001) 
(“Traditionally, courts recognized a distinction between eligibility for discretionary relief, 
on the one hand, and the favorable exercise of discretion, on the other hand.”). Still, knowing 
about the potential for relief is surely the first step on the path to a grant of relief.  
 125 Castro-O’Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Immigration & Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 
(9th Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 
(2010) (“Immigration law can be complex, and it is a legal specialty of its own.”). 
 126 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 5, at 2403, 2407. The reality remains that most 
noncitizens face immigration court alone, confused, and vulnerable.  
 127 See id. at 2401. There is a great deal of scholarship arguing for government-provided 
counsel in removal proceedings; nevertheless, no change has been made, with the exception 
of appointed counsel for mentally incompetent immigrant detainees. See Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security Announce 
Safeguards for Unrepresented Immigration Detainees with Serious Mental Disorders or 
Conditions (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pr/department-justice-and-
department-homeland-security-announce-safeguards-unrepresented [https://perma.cc 
/N8VZ-24A6].  
 128 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
 129 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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outlining the forms of relief and statutory eligibility requirements.130 This 
approach would relieve IJs of the duty to inform each noncitizen before them of 
their statutory eligibility for relief, but it would be an inadequate safeguard. As 
discussed above, immigration law is especially complex, and written 
notification of statutory requirements would be insufficient to inform 
noncitizens of their eligibility for relief.131 Additionally, written notice would 
be inadequate in light of the recognition that noncitizens must be personally 
informed of the opportunity to avoid deportation in criminal proceedings.132 Of 
course, immigration proceedings are not subject to the same standards as 
criminal proceedings,133 but the principle is the same—for information about 
avoiding deportation to be of any value to noncitizens, they must be personally 
informed during their proceedings.  
Without being made aware of their eligibility for discretionary relief from 
removal, there is a serious risk that noncitizens who are statutorily eligible for a 
form of discretionary relief will be deprived of their right to be considered for 
relief from removal.134 The erroneous deprivation of their rights is likely due to 
                                                                                                                     
 130 For example, noncitizens in removal proceedings are issued a notice identifying free 
or low-cost legal service providers in their area. See Exec. Office of Immigration Review, If 
You Are in Removal Proceedings, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 12, 2018), https://www.justice 
.gov/eoir/pro-bono-legal-service-providers-if-in-immigration-proceedings [https:// 
perma.cc/Q9XX-DP82]. Another possible substitute safeguard would be to place the duty 
on counsel to inform noncitizens of their eligibility for relief, but that too would be 
inadequate, as discussed in infra Part IV.C. 
 131 See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.  
 132 In 2010, the Supreme Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010), 
that noncitizen defendants in criminal proceedings must be informed by defense counsel of 
possible immigration consequences before entering a guilty plea. The obligation to 
personally inform noncitizen defendants about immigration consequences was later applied 
to judges as well. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(O) (2014) (requiring that in criminal 
proceedings, before the court accepts a guilty plea, the court must address the defendant and 
personally inform him “that, if convicted, a defendant who is not a United States citizen may 
be removed from the United States, denied citizenship, and denied admission to the United 
States in the future”). Many states also have statutes requiring judges to advise noncitizen 
defendants of the potential immigration consequences of a criminal conviction. See NIKKI 
REISCH & SARA ROSELL, IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT & N.Y.U SCH. OF LAW, JUDICIAL 
OBLIGATIONS AFTER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 12 (Oct. 2011), http://www.immigrant 
defenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/postpadillaFINALnew.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4E6Y-9GAC]. 
 133 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.  
 134 The Supreme Court recently ruled on a related issue concerning the notice that 
initiates removal proceedings. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (2018). At issue in 
Pereira was whether a noncitizen served with a document labeled “notice to appear,” but 
which fails to include a time or place of the removal proceedings, was adequate notice. Id. 
The Court held that such a notice obviously does not adequately inform a noncitizen of the 
proceedings, as is necessary to constitute a “notice to appear” under 8 U.S.C. 1229(a). Id. 
Although Justice Sotomayor concluded that the issue could be resolved on statutory 
interpretation alone, she also noted that common sense led unambiguously to the conclusion 
that a “notice to appear,” without a time or place of removal proceedings, was no notice at 
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the complexity of immigration law, that most noncitizens do not have counsel 
to assist them in this process, and because nearly all forms of relief from removal 
are categorized as “discretionary.” As a result, LPRs have no hope of relief 
without at least being made aware that they are eligible to apply for relief. 
Additionally, substitute procedural safeguards, such as issuing noncitizens 
written notice, are inadequate.  
3. The Government’s Interest in Accurate Adjudications 
The third factor in the Mathews v. Eldridge test is a consideration of the 
government’s interests, including fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
procedural requirements would entail.135 In Landon v. Plasencia, the 
government’s interest in controlling immigration matters was identified as “a 
sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the Executive and the 
Legislature.”136 The role of the judiciary was identified as limited to 
“determining whether the procedures meet the essential standard of fairness 
under the Due Process Clause and does not extend to imposing procedures that 
merely displace congressional choices of policy.”137 Thus, consideration of both 
the legislative prerogative and judicial control over discretionary relief are 
relevant.  
The legislature’s imperative, as it relates to this issue, is the creation of 
forms of discretionary relief enumerated in the INA. Congress has passed 
legislation providing for various forms of relief from removal for LPRs who, 
although they are otherwise removable, warrant consideration to remain in the 
United States.138 Noncitizens who are statutorily eligible for relief therefore are 
deserving of consideration for relief per legislative prerogative, even though 
they may ultimately not be granted relief.  
 The government’s interest, more generally, is in accurate adjudications.139 
To ensure accurate adjudications, the INA vests great power in IJs, including 
the responsibility of considering noncitizens’ eligibility for relief from 
removal.140 Making noncitizens aware of discretionary relief from removal for 
                                                                                                                     
all. Id. at 2114–15. The Court thus has recognized that not providing a noncitizen with 
adequate information undermines the credibility of the proceeding. Id. Here, such a 
commonsense conclusion is also warranted. 
 135 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  
 136 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).  
 137 Id. at 34–35.  
 138 Several forms of discretionary relief are based on hardship to U.S. citizen or LPR 
relatives in the United States. See, e.g., INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2012). 
Additionally, statutory eligibility for discretionary relief sometimes hinges on length of 
residence in the United States. For example, cancellation of removal requires seven years of 
residence for LPRs. INA § 240A(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2). Creating length of residence 
requirements signals Congress’s intent that those who have established a life in the United 
States are worthy of consideration that they may remain.  
 139 Nadadur, supra note 109, at 166.  
 140 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (2012).  
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which they are statutorily eligible would seem to follow from a responsibility to 
consider the noncitizen’s eligibility. Nevertheless, the government’s interest in 
efficient administration of cases may cut against such a conclusion. IJs face 
enormous caseloads and the argument could certainly be made that identifying 
additional procedural safeguards with which they must comply would 
unacceptably increase the IJs’ burden.141 However, while this places a burden 
on already overburdened IJs, it is a burden clearly contemplated by the statutory 
framework that vests IJs with great responsibility over discretionary relief.142  
Though recognizing a due process right here may impact efficiency, no 
additional costs to the government are immediately apparent.143 Making 
noncitizens aware of their eligibility for relief from removal would merely 
require the IJ to personally inform the noncitizen of their eligibility for relief 
during a proceeding that is already underway. 
The government’s interest in removal proceedings includes ensuring that 
adjudications are accurate. It is in the government’s interest that LPRs who are 
statutorily eligible for relief—thus fitting within Congress’s priorities for who 
merits relief—are considered for such relief. Although ensuring procedural 
safeguards will always come with administrative efficiency concerns, here, 
where the safeguard involves no additional proceedings nor any significant 
additional expense to the government, this concern should be minimal.  
Analyzing this issue within the framework of the Mathews v. Eldridge 
balancing test, then, shows that there is, on balance, a due process violation if 
                                                                                                                     
 141 Immigration Court Backlog Surpasses One Million Cases, TRAC IMMIGR. (Nov. 6, 
2018), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/536/ [https://perma.cc/98VH-XY74] 
(reporting a backlog of 768,257 pending deportation cases). In light of the backlog, in 2018, 
then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions imposed quotas on IJs, directing them to clear at least 
700 cases a year. Joel Rose, Justice Department Rolls Out Quotas for Immigration Judges, 
NPR (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/03/599158232/justice-department-rolls-
out-quotas-for-immigration-judges [https://perma.cc/WWC9-AX28]. Imposing quotas 
demonstrates the backlog of immigration cases, but also reflects due process concerns, which 
IJs themselves have raised. See, e.g., Audie Cornish, Immigration Judge Says Quota Will 
Cripple Already Overburdened System, NPR (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/ 
04/04/599579225/immigration-judge-says-case-quota-will-affect-impartiality-in-the-
courtroom [https://perma.cc/2WRQ-2Z32].  
 142 IJs must develop the record, consider noncitizens eligibility for relief, and decide 
whether they merit favorable grants of relief. See infra notes 145–47 and accompanying text. 
Additionally, some regulations impose additional obligations on IJs. See Moran-Enriquez v. 
INS, 884 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1989) (“We read the ‘apparent eligibility’ standard of 8 
C.F.R. § 242.17(a) to mean that where the record, fairly reviewed by an individual who is 
intimately familiar with the immigration laws—as IJs no doubt are—raises a reasonable 
possibility that the petitioner may be eligible for relief, the IJ must advise the alien of this 
possibility and give him the opportunity to develop the issue.”).  
 143 This procedural safeguard, unlike calls for government-appointed counsel, is not 
likely to invoke significant concerns for government expense. See Nadadur, supra note 109, 
at 165–66 (discussing that opponents of heightened safeguards in removal proceedings often 
cite government expense as a factor weighing against implementation of the procedure, and 
that appointed counsel would likely be very costly).  
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an LPR who is eligible for a form of discretionary relief is not made aware of 
their eligibility in removal proceedings. The individual interests, no matter how 
they are cast, are undoubtedly weighty. The likelihood of erroneous deprivation 
of these interests is also weighty, given the complexity of immigration law, 
widespread lack of counsel, and the reality that discretionary relief is essentially 
the only relief available. And, the government’s interest supports recognition of 
this due process right in that the government wants accurate adjudications. 
Finally, the government factors weighing against this right—primarily 
administrative efficiency and cost—are not especially pertinent in this instance. 
Thus, on balance, LPRs in removal proceedings are due the process of being 
made aware of discretionary relief for which they are eligible.  
C. Immigration Judges, as Opposed to Counsel, Have a Duty to Make 
LPRs Aware of Discretionary Relief from Removal  
The role of IJs is a special one, and one that is not easily comprehended 
from the vantage point of other judicial systems.144 IJs have the responsibility 
to develop the record, interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the noncitizen 
and any witnesses.145 Most importantly in this context, IJs consider the 
noncitizen’s eligibility for discretionary relief from removal.146 The nature of 
IJs’ responsibilities in removal proceedings is such that they consider the 
noncitizen’s eligibility for relief and make the ultimate determination of the 
noncitizen’s fate.147 This responsibility positions IJs to make noncitizens aware 
of their eligibility for relief or wholly deny noncitizens this information.  
The argument could be made, and has been made, by Mr. Estrada and others, 
that counsel’s failure to advise them of their eligibility for discretionary relief 
was a violation of their due process rights.148 Unquestionably, as a matter of 
professional responsibility, counsel should always inform and advise clients 
about their potential eligibility for relief from removal.149 However, given the 
nature of immigration proceedings, counsels’ shortcomings under such 
                                                                                                                     
 144 IJs certainly differ from Article III judges in a variety of ways, ranging from 
appointments, tenure, and responsibilities. See Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and 
the Adjudication of Immigration Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1501, 1526, 1542 (2010). But they also 
differ significantly from Administrative Law Judges both in appointments and 
responsibilities. See Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench: An Ethical 
Perspective, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 467, 472–75 (2008) (discussing the Attorney General’s role 
in appointments of IJs and the power and control the Attorney General has over IJs).  
 145 INA § 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2012); see also United States v. Lopez-
Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing the role of IJs).  
 146 Koh, supra note 20, at 1813.  
 147 Benedetto, supra note 144, at 475–76.  
 148 Brief for Appellant, supra note 8, at 11.  
 149 This should be so as a matter of professional responsibility. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
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circumstances do not necessarily give rise to a due process violation. The issue 
stems from the lack of a guaranteed right to counsel in removal proceedings.150  
Although noncitizens in removal proceedings have the right to retain 
counsel for the proceedings,151 there is no right to appointed counsel.152 The 
majority of noncitizens are unrepresented in removal proceedings and thus are 
without counsel to make any advisement about their eligibility for relief.153  
But beyond the reality that a lack of representation in effect means there is 
often no attorney to advise noncitizens of their eligibility for relief from 
removal, the absence of a right to guaranteed counsel means that a noncitizen’s 
ability to establish a due process violation based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel in the immigration context is by no means guaranteed. In the criminal 
context, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of 
counsel, and when counsel performs deficiently in a prejudicial manner, the 
defendant can prove a violation of their constitutional right.154 But, when the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply, the Supreme Court has held 
that counsel’s errors do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.155  
Imagining this due process issue in the criminal context, where the Sixth 
Amendment applies, it seems obvious that the duty to inform would properly be 
one owed from counsel to client; and a failure to make a client aware of relief 
would properly give way to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.156 The 
                                                                                                                     
 150 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing that immigration proceedings 
are not criminal proceedings).  
 151 INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012).  
 152 See Note, A Second Chance: The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in 
Immigration Removal Proceedings, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1544, 1548–49 (2007) (stating that 
because the Supreme Court has long held that immigration proceedings are not criminal 
proceedings, there is no right to court-appointed counsel in removal proceedings).  
 153 See supra note 123 (citing statistics on the low levels of representation in removal 
proceedings). The rate of representation for LPRs specifically is not available; even the most 
comprehensive source of immigration court data does not break down the numbers by 
immigration status. See Details on Deportation Proceedings in Immigration Court, TRAC 
IMMIGR. (Jan. 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/nta/ [https://perma.cc/ 
AR3A-ALXX]. 
 154 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686–87 (1984).  
 155 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752–54 (1991) (holding that because 
there was no constitutional right to appointed counsel for an appeal of a state trial court 
habeas judgment, there was no constitutional basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel); see also Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587–88 (1982) (holding that “[s]ince 
respondent had no constitutional right to counsel, he could not be deprived of the effective 
assistance of counsel by his retained counsel’s failure to file the application timely”). Despite 
these holdings, the Board of Immigration Appeals and several federal appeals courts 
established conflicting precedents on whether there was a constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel in removal proceedings. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 13, at 940–41. 
The right to effective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings remains murky. Id. at 
941–42.  
 156 For example, the Supreme Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky that a criminal defendant 
was denied effective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to advise him that his 
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same simply does not follow in immigration proceedings, in which there is no 
guaranteed right to effective assistance of counsel.  
As a result, attributing the duty to be made aware of discretionary relief 
from removal to counsel would not adequately protect the due process rights of 
noncitizens in removal proceedings.157 But it would also ignore that IJs already 
have the responsibility to consider noncitizens’ eligibility for relief and play a 
critical role in guiding unrepresented noncitizens through removal 
proceedings.158 
If a due process right to be made aware of relief was recognized only to 
attach to counsel’s conduct, the majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings 
would be left without this due process protection. Beyond this recognition, 
though, the basic structure of removal proceedings and the statutory 
responsibilities vested in IJs by the INA suggest that this procedural due process 
right imposes a duty on IJs to inform noncitizens of their eligibility for 
discretionary relief from removal.  
Resolution of this issue by the Supreme Court in the foreseeable future is 
unlikely.159 Unfortunately, so too is congressional action.160 In the meantime, 
the Department of Justice through the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(EOIR)—home of the Immigration Courts—should clarify IJs’ responsibilities 
to inform deportable LPRs of their eligibility to apply for discretionary relief 
from removal. This can be accomplished in two ways. First, EOIR should issue 
a policy memorandum instructing IJs to personally inform LPRs who appear 
eligible for a form of discretionary relief, of their eligibility and ability to apply 
for relief, in removal proceedings.161 Second, EOIR should update the 
Immigration Judge Benchbook, which serves as a reference guide for IJs on how 
                                                                                                                     
guilty plea to a drug-related charge made him subject to mandatory deportation. Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368–69 (2010).  
 157 Although noncitizens have a right to counsel in removal proceedings, they have no 
constitutionally protected right to appointed counsel. See Johan Fatemi, A Constitutional 
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2414 (arguing that LPRs should be afforded government-appointed counsel).  
 158 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2010) 
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 159 Estrada v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2623 (2018) (denying petition for writ of 
certiorari).  
 160 See generally Elaine Kamarck & Christine Stenglein, Can Immigration Reform 
Happen? A Look Back, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
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.cc/B978-YA94] (describing gridlock on immigration reform for the last three decades).  
 161 The EOIR Office of Policy issues memoranda concerning Immigration Court 
policies. See Exec. Office of Immigration Review, Office of Policy, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 
21, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-policy [https://perma.cc/QXR6-AGFK].  
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to conduct proceedings, to include this duty.162 These reforms will provide IJs 
with clarity as to their responsibilities to LPRs in removal proceedings.  
This issue also must be addressed from the perspective of collateral attacks 
on prior deportation orders that lacked this procedural due process protection. 
Courts must recognize these orders to be “fundamentally unfair” and allow 
noncitizens like Mr. Estrada to challenge their prior deportation orders on this 
basis.163 Otherwise, due process violations will continue to permeate re-entry 
prosecutions and removal proceedings alike.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The number of noncitizens in deportation proceedings is at historic highs. 
The same is true of prosecutions for unlawful re-entry. Now more than ever, 
ensuring that noncitizens receive due process protections is critical. Deporting 
LPRs who are eligible for relief from removal without even informing them of 
this relief should not pass constitutional muster—such orders are fundamentally 
unfair. LPRs establish a permanent life in the United States and come to rely 
upon this status through social and legal expectations. Although LPRs who 
commit certain offenses are removable, they have a protectable liberty interest 
in remaining in the United States. Balancing private interests, likelihood of 
deprivation of rights without such safeguards, and the government’s interests, it 
is clear that LPRs in removal proceedings are due the process of being made 
aware of discretionary relief from removal. IJs must inform LPRs of their 
eligibility for discretionary relief from removal to ensure this protection.  
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